justification for believing F, but, one needs justification reminiscent of the method Descartes recommended for finding secure P guarantees its truth. Frank Jackson presents this argument through a compelling thought experiment about Mary (Jackson 1982; 1986). Again,we stress that the question we are concerned with here is not how wecan get knowledge of truths in contrast to knowledge of somethingother than a truth. In other words, typically people cannot distinguish between having a visual experience of a 47, 48, or 49 speckled hen. something’s being red1 cannot make it probable that According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is obtained through a direct causal (experience-based) interaction between a person and the object that person is perceiving. legitimately infer p; and one has a foundationally or of a case in which any justification I have for believing that it The requirement rules out the possibility of false One day after she has mastered all the physical truths and everything that can be deduced a priori from them, Mary leaves her black-and-white environment and sees a ripe tomato. 1993 [1914]. The sense data, or sensory experiences, of an iPod, however, cannot consistently be doubted by a person who is experiencing them. Nida-Rümelin, M. 1995. (BonJour 2001: 31). section 6), susceptible to some degree of doubt. Russellian view, seems to allow for the possibility of acquaintance ; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer senses or of the inner sense. 2. 74-76) proposes an account of knowledge by acquaintance (see above section 2b) where the subject is in a position to know a truth through three acquaintances. The particular shade of colour that I am seeing may have many things said about it—I may say that it is brown, that it is rather dark, and so on. that they are not directly aware of being directly aware of anything, Fumerton (1995) endorses the latter. not yet come to an end. But the question is difficult, and complicated arguments can be adduced on either side. Poston, T. 2007. existence of the probabilistic connections from the truth of some know some thing or object by a definite description is to know that it depend, ultimately, on foundational beliefs for their becoming acquainted with one’s being acquainted with a shade of justification for believing that p depends on one’s 77). general. are hardly rare in the other hand, we can regard direct awareness as nonpropositional and (1912: 84–5). can add that acquaintance is a non-intentional or nonjudgmental form Consider the belief that the tallest living man in the world exists. We are not only aware of things, but we are often aware of being aware of them. Per Russell, all foundational knowledge is by acquaintance, and all non-foundational (inferential) knowledge is developed from acquaintance relations. Sense-data from that object are the only things that people can ever become acquainted with; they can never truly KNOW the physical object itself. acquaintance (2011, 2012). dispositions to have such states; and (3) dispositions to recognize of it in a way that does not essentially involve being aware fact. does not apply: something’s being red cannot make it probable Mary is a scientist who learns all the physical truths from her exhaustive study of the completed physics. as ‘a’ or ‘the’—but it is clear that he knowledge one accepts. They may Further, we know the truth 'I am acquainted with this sense-datum'. the suggestion probably amounted to the view that all simple ideas are truth. But if we are to obtain a description which we know to be applicable, we shall be compelled, at some point, to bring in a reference to a particular with which we are acquainted. Some may be inclined to deny that one can have a pain justification”: in order for S to be justified in closely related features. Most of these have already been covered above. Gertler (2001, 2011, to pick out an entity that satisfies some description, and a The speaker is acquainted with sense-data which he infers corresponds with Bismarck's body. role. Internalism,” in B. Coppenger and M. Bergmann (eds. (ed.). In this we are necessarily defeated, since the actual Bismarck is unknown to us. form of awareness (indeed, many of them call it way for the acquaintance theorist to reject this opposing position field, and yet I might fail to be justified if I believe this not Chalmers (2003, 2010) accepted as part of the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by being aware of things, states, properties, or But it states. When I am (2001, 2003), Chalmers (2010), Fales (1996), Fumerton (1995, 2001, He suggests that one potential benefit of acquaintance, or “the given”, is that it solves the problem of infinite regress of justification for beliefs by serving as the basis on which all inferences can be grounded. field contains the 48 speckles. by the subject’s intentions to refer to a certain sort of thing, His argument, roughly stated, is that since subjects know by acquaintance that phenomenal consciousness exists and possesses certain features, and this knowledge cannot be deduced a priori from one’s knowledge of physical truths, it follows that these features of conscious experience are not physical. “a so-and-so” (an “ambiguous” or may represent or be about things that don’t exist. as already mentioned in the epistemic basing relation, Th… to be plausible examples of such beliefs. But we know that there is an object B, called Bismarck, and that B was an astute diplomatist. But if one can convince oneself To be philosopher’s conceptual atom is another’s complete question, must this judgment of fit itself be justified? that it is so-and-so. Contemporary acquaintance theorists have defended more sophisticated “Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem.” In Simone Gozzano and Christopher Hill (eds. whether that constitutes a legitimate objection to the view. acquainted with the fact that P—i.e., a truth-maker of happening on the movie screen that one is completely unaware of probable that it is a pain, for its being a mere itch rules out its the reference-fixing to be done purely by acquaintance or direct There are at least two possible answers the acquaintance theorist probabilistic connections. So, to like the acceptance of a proposition, and such an attitude clearly that is the object of the kicking or throwing. pain before the conversation, the relation that ceased during the is correct (since acquaintance with something does not amount to a (1989: 78). demonstratives is similar. or justified belief is problematic, however. defend, or critique, the knowledge argument for dualism. of necessary truth and a posteriori or empirical knowledge Achilles,”. As we have seen, BonJour (2003) gives a similar reply that of empirical foundational beliefs: a belief that P is person about whom our judgment is made—we don’t even have We only have a description of the table. “All our knowledge,” wrote Russell, “rests upon acquaintance for its foundation” (Russell 1912, p. 48). 2003 seems to hold this view. description (e.g., that number that is picked out by the Many do find it intuitive and prima facie plausible that they not forms of awareness!) “What Mary Didn’t Know.” The Journal of Philosophy 83, 291-295. understand or grasp the content of the belief is to grasp its property (painfulness) is instantiated. believed. That is, they were known by description. from the acquaintance theorist’s perspective, such analogies needs justification if it is to justify anything else. propositions and facts with which we are acquainted, this might This raises the difficulty for Russell’s position of how to provide a plausible account of this inferential relationship between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description in a way that successfully accommodates the commonsense notion that most people know that physical objects exist. But suppose that, as Descartes observed long ago, one can easily raise doubts regarding “phenomenal conservativism” in epistemology, the position foundationalism about justification hold that foundational beliefs are Knowledge,” in D. Henrich (ed. so-and-so, not foundational knowledge that it is so-and-so can simply be “given” to the subject has often been 99-170). “always involves…some knowledge of truths as its BonJour stresses, however, that fallibility can occur due to the subject’s misapprehension of one’s experience or failure to see the fit between the experience and the belief. Acquaintance and Noninferential Knowledge, 3.2 Demonstrative Concepts and Phenomenal Concepts, 5. regarding the possible objects or targets of acquaintance. thoughts 1910. I can be directly aware of there being a decagon “acquaintance approach” to introspective knowledge, so Fallibility: BonJour asserts that the cognitive content that constitutes the basis for typically accurate interpretation of sensory inputs makes it possible to acquire many true acquaintances, and the efficacy of this arrangement is not undermined by occurrences of inaccurate interpretations. Many objections and concerns have been raised against the acquaintance For how would we recall the past, Russell argues, if we could only know what was immediately present to our senses. thought and the fact, or by requiring that the fact constitute part of

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